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When a visual scene, containing many discrete objects, is presented to our retinae, only a subset of these objects will be 
explicitly represented in visual awareness. The number of objects accessing short-term visual memory might be even 
smaller. Finally, it is not known to what extent “ignored” objects (those that do not enter visual awareness) will be 
processed –or recognized. By combining free recall, forced-choice recognition and visual priming paradigms for the same 
natural visual scenes and subjects, we were able to estimate these numbers, and provide insights as to the fate of objects 
that are not explicitly recognized in a single fixation. When presented for 250 ms with a scene containing 10 distinct 
objects, human observers can remember up to 4 objects with full confidence, and between 2 and 3 more when forced to 
guess. Importantly, the objects that the subjects consistently failed to report elicited a significant negative priming effect 
when presented in a subsequent task, suggesting that their identity was represented in high-level cortical areas of the 
visual system, before the corresponding neural activity was suppressed during attentional selection. These results shed 
light on neural mechanisms of attentional competition, and representational capacity at different levels of the human visual 
system. 
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 Introduction 
Every eye fixation brings to our retinae a new visual 
scene, from which the visual system must extract the most 
relevant information. Clearly, not all objects from a 
typical scene will be consciously registered (Rensink et al., 
1997; O’Regan et al, 1999; Simons & Levin, 1998). 
Among those that will, many will not be consolidated 
into visual memory, and will be rapidly forgotten 
(Sperling, 1960; Baddeley, 1986). The visual system must 
therefore continuously and actively select at different 
stages the properties or objects relevant to current 
behavior and higher cognitive functions. How does this 
selection occur? What determines, and what is the 
relation between what we see, what we almost see, and what 
we fail to see? 
There is increasing evidence that at least some form 
of high-level representation of the visual scene can be 
accessed very rapidly (Thorpe et al., 1996; VanRullen & 
Thorpe, 2001), in an automatic and possibly unconscious 
way (Ohman & Soares, 1994, 1998; Esteves et al., 1994; 
Dehaene et al., 1998; Bar et al, 2001; VanRullen & Koch, 
in press). This representation can be detailed enough to 
allow subjects to detect an animal in a briefly flashed 
image, or to categorize a scene in rapid serial visual 
presentation (RSVP; Potter & Levy, 1969; Potter, 1976; 
Bar & Biederman, 1998; Coltheart, 1999). In contrast, 
consciously recognizing an object probably requires some 
form of attention to be drawn selectively to this object 
(Rensink et al., 1997; Simons & Chabris, 1999; Mack & 
Rock, 1998). Further selection might be required in 
deciding what objects should be consolidated in memory, 
and what objects can be forgotten. Figure 1 illustrates this 
continuous selection process among successive levels of 
representation. 
The capacity of these different levels of visual 
representation (preconscious, conscious, short-term 
memory) can be assessed with specific paradigms. Free 
recall is typically used to access the contents of immediate 
working memory, in general found to contain around 4 
objects (Sperling, 1960; Broadbent, 1975; Pylyshyn & 
Storm, 1988; Yantis 1992; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Cowan 
2001). Implicit measures, such as performance in forced-
choice recognition, or visual priming, can be used to 
determine which objects were perceived, even when they 
are not explicitly remembered (e.g. Biederman & Cooper, 
1991; Bar & Biederman, 1998, 1999).  
However, estimates of capacity obtained by different 
studies with different paradigms, and at different levels of 
representation, are very unlikely to be comparable. Here 
we apply a combination of three such paradigms (free 
recall, forced-choice recognition, and visual priming) on 
the same complex natural scenes and for the same 
subjects. Immediately after a large natural scene 
containing 10 different objects was briefly presented, 
subjects had to report the objects that they had perceived. 
They could also “guess” an additional number of objects. 
Subsequently, these same objects were presented among 
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other unfamiliar ones in a word-picture matching task. 
Reaction times were analyzed to reveal visual priming. 
Surprisingly, the objects that the subjects could neither 
explicitly report nor guess elicited a significant negative 
priming effect, suggesting that they had been suppressed 
at a rather late stage of visual processing. 
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Figure 1. Different levels of representation in the visual system 
(schematic). At each stage, information can be filtered out or 
selected to access the following stage. Different experimental 
paradigms can query the contents of these representations. 
Verbal report (or free recall) is typically used to estimate the 
capacity of visual short-term memory. Note that a number of 
studies refer to visual short-term memory as an early visual 
buffer, not necessarily conscious (Phillips & Baddeley, 1971; 
Phillips, 1974; Tulving & Schacter, 1990; Jiang et al, 2000; 
Magnussen, 2000). Here we adopt a more intuitive definition: 
an item (object or property of an object) is considered as being 
stored in short-term memory if it can be recalled, i.e. explicitly 
reported. In this context, memorized objects necessarily are or 
have been represented into visual awareness, at the time they 
are reported. In contrast, implicit measures such as visual 
priming or performance in forced-choice recognition can 
determine which objects have reached a high-level 
representation. Among these objects, some will be selected by 
attention to enter visual awareness, and a certain number 
might be filtered out. 
It is necessary to stress that negative priming has been 
known for over 20 years as a reflection of active 
attentional suppression of ignored objects (Neill 1977; 
Tipper 1985; Fox 1995). However, it is typically observed 
in situations where a unique target (attended) object 
competes with another unique overlapping distractor 
(ignored) object, and the to-be-attended property (e.g. 
color) is defined in advance. Here negative priming is 
reported under “realistic” conditions of stimulation, 
where different objects of a natural scene compete for 
attentional resources and selection, and observers have no 
a priori bias as to what object or property they should 
attend to. 
Methods 
Free Recognition and Forced-Choice 
Recognition 
Each of 10 stimulus scenes (Figure 2A), containing 10 
objects, was presented for 250 ms, immediately followed 
by a strong contrast color mask (a situation designed to 
approximate an average single fixation). The mask was 
obtained by superimposing many different samples of 
white noise that were band-pass filtered at particular 
spatial frequencies, so that the resulting mask would 
display a power spectrum resembling that of natural 
images (i.e. 1/f). The scene and mask subtended 16 
degrees of visual angle in width. Immediately after each 
scene, subjects were presented with a list of 20 object 
names, including the 10 target objects. Distractor object 
names were carefully chosen so that they could have 
normally been present in the context of the scene. 
Subjects were asked to report the objects that they had 
consciously perceived with full confidence (free 
recognition). After signaling that they were not confident 
anymore, they had to select a further number of objects 
(forced-choice recognition), so that the overall number of 
selected objects, including the ones reported with full 
confidence, was exactly 10. Note that the term “forced-
choice recognition” generally refers to a situation where 
the number of alternatives is determined by the 
experimenter. In our case, the number of alternatives is 
determined by the subjects’ performance in the previous 
“free recognition” task. 
Correction for Guessing 
R*, the corrected number of objects reported in free 
recognition (correct reports that can not be explained by 
chance), is defined as: 
R* = R+ - R- 
where R+ and R- are the number of target and distractor 
objects reported by a given subject for a given scene. Note 
that high-threshold models (commonly used to estimate 
capacity; Pashler, 1988; Luck & Vogel, 1997) suggest a 
slightly different correction method: 
R* = (R+ - R-) / (1 - R-/10)  . 
However, R- is small enough in our case, and the 
difference between these 2 methods can be neglected. 
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In the forced-choice recognition part of the report 
task, the a priori distributions of probability for target and 
distractor objects are not equal but depend on the 
previous responses (R+, R-) of each subject for each scene. 
Therefore, the number G* of “above-chance guesses” can 
be defined as: 
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where G+ and G- are the number of correct and incorrect 
guesses. 
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Visual Priming 
Immediately after the forced-choice recognition task 
for each scene, the subjects had to perform a block of 40 
trials of a word-picture matching task, in which some of 
the stimuli were target objects that had appeared in the 
previous scene. In each trial, an object name was 
presented for 500 ms and, following an inter-stimulus 
interval of 1 second, an object image was flashed at 
fixation for 250 ms. The subjects held down the mouse 
button continuously, and had to release it as fast as 
possible, within 1 second, if and only if the object picture 
matched the previous word. The objects were presented 
on a uniform grey background of the same luminance as 
the rest of the screen. Object size was variable, between 
approximately 2 and 10 degrees of visual angle. The 
objects that were extracted from the scene were always 
presented with their original size, at the fixation point. 
The average change in eccentricity for a given object 
between its presentation in the scene and its presentation 
in isolation was around 3.5 degrees. All 20 object names 
from the free recognition and forced-choice recognition 
tasks (10 targets and 10 distractors) were presented in this 
block. The 10 target objects always matched the target 
names (“match” trials). Five of the 10 distractor words 
were paired with a matching object, and five with a non-
matching object. Finally, in an additional 20 trials of the 
same block, both the object name and the object picture 
were totally new (15 “match” and 5 “non-match” trials). 
Note that the familiarity of the written name (i.e. whether 
it belonged or not to the list of 20 objects in the previous 
task) did not predict the status (match/non-match) of the 
following object, since in both cases the probability of a 
match trial was 75%. The order of the trials was 
randomized in each block. Reaction times (RT) were 
recorded for each trial, and were used as a measure of 
visual priming.  
Experimental Setup 
Ten subjects in each group (test and control) 
participated in the experiment. They were seated in a 
dark room, 120 cm from a computer screen connected to 
a SGI (O2) workstation. They were first trained on 2 
examples of simple scenes and the corresponding word-
picture matching task blocks. The group of control 
subjects performed the experiment in reverse order, 
viewing the word-picture matching task before they were 
presented with each scene and had to report their 
contents. The reaction times from these subjects in the 
word-picture matching task were used as a reference (no 
priming). Furthermore, their performance in the report 
task (free and forced-choice recognition) allows us to 
determine if and how object recognition is facilitated by a 
prior single exposure to target objects.  
To summarize, the test subjects were presented with a 
scene, asked to report (or guess) its contents, then 
performed the corresponding word-picture matching task; 
conversely, the control subjects were first asked to 
perform this word-picture matching task, then viewed the 
scene, and finally reported its contents. This sequence 
was repeated 10 times for each group. 
Results 
Free Recognition 
On average, subjects explicitly report 2.28 objects per 
scene (corrected for guessing; see Methods and Table 1). 
This number is dependent upon the particular scene, and 
upon individual subjects. The number of reported objects 
varies between 1.7 and 3 for different scenes (averaged 
across subjects), and between 1.8 and 2.7 for different 
subjects (averaged across scenes). 
Table 1. Average Number of Objects Selected in Each Scene. 
Objects/ 
Scene  Correct Incorrect Corrected 
 
d’ 
Free 
recognition Test 
2.61 
(/10) 
0.33 
(/10) 2.28 1.16 
  0.44 0.26 0.35 0.22 
 Control 3.52 (/10) 
0.21 
(/10) 3.31 1.63 
  0.74 0.15 0.65 0.22 
Forced- 
choice 
recognition 
Test 3.96 (/7.39) 
3.08 
(/9.67) 2.28 0.56 
  0.64 0.53 1.18 0.30 
 Control 3.72 (/6.48) 
2.56 
(/9.79) 2.72 0.82 
  0.67 0.38 0.71 0.21 
Average number of objects selected in each scene, during the 
free recognition and the forced-choice recognition tasks, for 
test and control subjects. The number of remaining elements to 
choose from is indicated in parenthesis where applicable. 
Correction for guessing is calculated as described in the 
Methods. Standard deviation is indicated below each number. 
d' is also provided for information. 
The group of control subjects, who have been 
presented once with the target objects, performs reliably 
better (paired t-test, d.f.=9, t=5.55, p<.001). On average, 
these subjects report 3.31 objects per scene 
(corresponding to a 45% increase in recognition 
performance). This increase is paralleled by a 
corresponding increase of about 40% of the d’. Here 
again, performance varies across individual subjects (from 
2.7 to 4.8) and scenes (from 2.1 to 4.2).  Interestingly, the 
number of errors (R-) is not higher for these control 
subjects than for the test subjects (0.21 errors per scene 
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versus 0.33 errors per scene), indicating that this 
improvement truly reflects a facilitation of object 
recognition, and not simply a higher degree of 
confidence, or a change in report strategy. 
Forced-Choice Recognition 
The average (corrected) number of correct “guesses” 
for the group of test subjects is 2.28 (see Table 1). This 
number varies between 0.46 and 4.29 for individual 
scenes (averaged across subjects), and between 0 and 3.68 
for individual subjects (averaged across scenes). For 
control subjects, the average number of correct guesses is 
2.72, ranging from 1.1 to 4.5 for individual scenes and 
from 1.67 to 3.5 for individual subjects. Because control 
subjects had already reported more correct objects than 
test subjects in the free recognition task, they had fewer 
target and more distractor objects to choose from in the 
forced-choice recognition task. Taking into account these 
a priori probabilities for each group, this corresponds to a 
36% increase in recognition probability for control 
subjects versus test subjects. Note that the d' measure also 
parallels this increase of about 40% (Table 1). 
Figure 3 presents the combined results from the free 
recognition and forced-choice recognition tasks for each 
of the 10 scenes that were used as stimuli. The number of 
objects correctly “perceived” by test subjects (i.e., either 
explicitly reported, or guessed in the forced-choice 
recognition paradigm) varies between 2.3 and 6.1. After a 
single prior exposure to target objects, control subjects 
correctly perceive between 4.1 and 7.5 objects per scene.  
It is not entirely clear how many of these objects have 
reached a conscious level of representation. A lower 
bound of around 4 objects can be recalled from visual 
short-term memory. This number is compatible with 
previous measurements of the capacity of short-term 
memory, generally believed to contain between 4 and 6 
individual items (Sperling, 1960; Broadbent, 1975; 
Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Yantis 1992; Cowan 2001). 
Among the remaining objects, a certain number (and 
possibly all) might have accessed visual awareness, but 
without leaving a strong enough trace for later recall.  
It is important to note that the number of objects 
perceived can depend on the particular scene presented, 
and probably on specific properties of each target object, 
such as its overall saliency. Among the factors that might 
determine whether an object will be reported or not, 
retinal eccentricity (that is, distance from fixation point) 
and size seem to be of particular importance. As 
compared to an average over all objects, the distance from 
fixation point is 15% smaller (t-test, d.f.=9, t=5.39, 
p<.001) for the objects reported by test subjects, and 11% 
smaller (t=4.25, p<.005) for those reported by control 
subjects. The size of the objects reported by test subjects is 
also 25% larger (t>10, p<.0001) than the average size of 
all objects, and the objects reported by control subjects 
are 22% larger (t>10, p<.0001). Finally, the objects that 
were guessed during forced-choice recognition show a 
significant (t>4, p≤.001) trend in the other direction, 
being 8% smaller for test and 10% smaller for control 
subjects than the average size for all objects. Conversely, 
the objects that were missed (i.e., neither explicitly 
reported, nor guessed during forced-choice recognition) 
are 17% smaller than average (t=7.15, p<.0001) for test 
subjects and 20% smaller (t>10, p<.0001) for controls, 
while their distance from fixation is roughly 6% higher 
than the average (although this number is only significant 
for test subjects, at the p<.001 level, t=5.32). 
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Figure 3. Average number of objects correctly reported, 
guessed, or missed for each scene, and for the 2 subject 
groups. In each panel, the scenes are ordered according to the 
sum of the number of reported and guessed objects. The 
scene labels (from A to J) reflect this order for control subjects. 
The “coffee table” and “street” scenes from figure 2 correspond 
to labels C and G, respectively. The numbers of reported and 
guessed objects have been corrected for chance guessing as 
described in the Methods. This correction explains why a 
certain number of objects in each scene are not assigned to 
any category: they correspond to correct responses that were 
discarded by this correction. The triangles indicate the average 
numbers of reported, guessed and missed objects for each 
subject group. 
 
To summarize the results described so far, up to 7.5 
objects from a complex natural scene can be identified in 
a single fixation, although 6 would be a more reliable 
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We reasoned that if an object was positively (resp. 
negatively) primed, the actual reaction time should be 
shorter (resp. longer) than the reaction time of a control 
subject, viewing the same object for the first time. In 
order to make reaction times comparable between the test 
and control subject groups, we normalized the RTs of 
each test subject so that their mean and standard 
deviation for the set of new objects would match the 
mean and standard deviation of RTs of control subjects 
on these new objects. We then compared the RT 
obtained for each target object (i.e., an object that was 
present in the original scene) to the median RT of control 
subjects on the same object (in other words, this median 
RT was considered as a reference). If there was no 
significant priming effect, on average 50% of the RTs 
would fall below this reference, and 50% above (since 
there could have been no priming for the control subjects 
group). This is what we observed for the set of objects that 
were guessed in the forced-choice recognition task: 49% 
of these objects elicited RTs below the reference, and this 
proportion was not significantly different from 50% (χ2 
test, 396 observations, d.f.=1, χ2=.09, p=0.8). On the 
other hand, 55% of the objects that were explicitly 
reported in the free recognition task elicited RTs that 
were shorter than the reference, suggesting a non-
significant (261 observations, χ2=2.39, p=.1) positive 
priming effect, whereas 57.5% of the RTs on missed 
objects were longer than the reference, indicating a 
significant (343 observations, χ2=7.58, p=.005) negative 
priming effect for these objects. Whereas the former 
effect (positive priming) can be naturally expected to 
occur for objects that the subjects explicitly reported 
(because these objects have obviously been identified), the 
latter effect is more surprising. Indeed, when a subject 
reliably fails to report certain objects from the scene, it 
would be rather intuitive to conclude that these objects 
were not perceived. However, the negative priming effect 
suggests that these objects were in fact represented in the 
visual system, but that this representation was eventually 
suppressed. 
(and conservative) estimate. Up to 4 of these objects can 
be consolidated into visual short-term memory and are 
reported by subjects with high confidence as having been 
“seen”. We now turn to the question of the remaining 
objects, those that were neither reported in free 
recognition nor guessed in forced-choice recognition (the 
“missed” objects). Whereas these objects obviously did 
not access a conscious level of representation, it is still 
possible that they could have reached some “high” level of 
representation, i.e., been recognized before being filtered 
out. In other words, does the observed limitation occur at 
the level of visual awareness or visual short-term memory, 
or is this limitation a consequence of a low-level selection, 
occurring earlier on in the visual system? 
Visual Priming 
When a particular stimulus (hereafter called the 
“prime”) is presented to the visual system, even under 
conditions where it is not consciously perceived or 
remembered, it elicits a specific trace of neural activity, 
that can modify the processing of a subsequent repetition 
of the same stimulus (hereafter the “probe”). This 
phenomenon, known as visual priming, can take two 
distinct forms: either a stimulus-specific facilitation 
(Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Bar & Biederman, 1998, 
1999), or a stimulus-specific impairment of subsequent 
visual processing (Neill, 1977; Tipper, 1985). While the 
former effect (positive priming) usually occurs for the 
objects that are selected by visual attention (or under 
conditions of low attentional load), the latter (negative 
priming) is generally thought to reflect the suppression of 
ignored objects during attentional selection (e.g. Tipper 
& Driver, 1988; Fox, 1995; Moore, 1996), although 
alternative theories have been proposed (Neill et al, 1992; 
Park & Kanwisher, 1994). Visual priming has been 
shown to be invariant to low-level picture manipulations 
(translation, reflection; Biederman & Cooper, 1991), and 
specific to higher-level properties of the stimulus, such as 
its semantic category (Allport et al, 1985; Tipper & 
Driver, 1988). This negative priming effect is also significant when 
comparing mean RT (paired t-test, t(9)=3.27, p=.01) and 
error rate (t(9)=3, p=.015) between the set of missed 
objects and the set of new objects (Figure 4). These latter 
effects are not significant (t(9)=2.2, p=.055 for RTs; 
t(9)=1.48, p=.17 for error rates) for the group of control 
subjects, indicating again that the priming effects are 
indeed due to the prior perception of target objects in the 
scene. Additionally, the magnitude of this negative 
priming (calculated as the difference between error rates 
for “missed” vs. “new” objects) was stronger for test than 
control subjects (t(9)=2.96, p=.016). This effect is in fact 
strong enough (and in particular, stronger than the 
positive priming observed for explicitly reported objects) 
to be observed when we average over the entire set of 
target objects (whether explicitly reported, guessed, or 
missed): the overall error rate in the word-picture 
In order to determine whether objects of a particular 
group (e.g., missed objects) were perceived when the scene 
was presented, a block of 40 trials of a word-picture 
go/no-go matching task was performed after each entire 
report sequence (i.e. only once, after both free and forced-
choice recognition were completed for a scene). The 
target objects from the previous scene were extracted from 
their background and presented in this task, among other 
trials containing “new” objects that had not been present 
in the scene. On average, the delay between the 
presentation of the whole scene and the presentation of 
one of these 40 word-picture matching trials was around 2 
minutes, that is, well under the reported duration of 
visual priming (Bar & Biederman, 1998; DeSchepper & 
Treisman, 1996). 
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matching task is significantly (paired t-test, t(9)=2.4, 
p=.04) higher for target objects (6.2%) than for “new” 
objects that do not belong to the original scenes (4.0%). 
Once again, this comparison is not significant for control 
subjects (t(9)=1.13, p=.29).  
This observation is particularly important because it 
rules out alternative explanations based on the 
correlational nature of our analysis. Indeed, our subjects 
select by their performance which objects belong to the 
class of reported, guessed or missed objects for which 
priming will later be tested. One could therefore argue 
that our analysis only reveals correlations between bad 
performance in both the report task and the reaction time 
task. However, this is not true in our case because the 
group of test subjects actually performs worse on the 
overall set of target objects, independent of the 
correlation among images drawn from these three 
categories. 
One could also argue that subjects could recognize 
written names as part of the previous list, and use this 
information to bias their response in the word-picture 
matching task. In that case, the same “negative priming” 
should also be observed for “distractor” names, those that 
were actually presented in the previous list but not in the 
scene (indeed, from the subject’s point of view, there is 
no way to tell these objects from the “missed” objects). 
However, reaction times obtained for these distractor 
objects in the priming task are significantly shorter 
(paired t-test, t(9)=2.55, p=.03) than the ones for “missed” 
objects, and the error rates significantly lower (paired t-
test, t(9)=2.49, p=.035). These RTs and error rates for 
“distractor” objects are not significantly different 
(t(9)=1.37, p=.2 for RTs; t(9)=.12, p=.9) from those 
obtained for “new” objects . In other words, the fact that 
a name is recognized as part of the previous list, but not 
part of the scene, cannot by itself account for the 
observed negative priming. 
Yet another possible interpretation of this result 
could be that the difference between test and control 
subjects arises from a form of interference between the 
two tasks. For example, when presented with a missed 
object in the word-picture matching task, a test subject 
could realize that he (or she) failed to report this object as 
part of the previous scene. This in turn might interfere 
with the generation of the motor response. There could 
be no such effect for control subjects, who have not yet 
viewed the scene at the time of the word-picture matching 
task. However, because such an error judgment would 
require not only the identification of the object, but also 
access to the memory of responses from the previous task, 
one would expect it to mostly affect the longest RTs, i.e., 
those for which the subject has enough time to make this 
sort of judgment. In contrast, the shortest RTs would 
most probably reflect an automatic object recognition 
process. We find that the probability of generating a 
motor response for a missed object before 400 ms post-
stimulus is already significantly (paired t-test, d.f.=9, 
t=4.15, p<.005) smaller than the probability of 
responding to a new object (15% in the former case 
versus 26% in the latter), suggesting that object 
recognition itself, and not (only) later cognitive 
judgments, is impaired in the case of missed objects. In 
other words, this impairment is certainly a true negative 
priming effect, indicating that missed objects from the 
scene have indeed accessed a high level of representation, 
even if the resulting neural activity was too weak, or did 
not last long enough, to allow these objects to be 
consciously reported.  Er
ro
r R
at
e 
(%
)
0
2.5
5
7.5
10
12.5
N G
**
D
M
ea
n 
R
T 
 (m
s) 
450
460
470
480
490
500
510
N R G
**
D
R M
M
Figure 4. Mean error rates (top) and reaction times (bottom) in 
the word-picture matching task. Trials are grouped according 
to the performance of the subject in the previous report task: a 
target object can be either explicitly reported (R), guessed in 
forced-choice recognition (G), or missed (M). New trials (N) 
indicate that the object was not present in the previous scene, 
nor in the list of 20 object names. Distractor trials (D) refer to 
object names that were present in the list, but not in the 
previous scene. Error bars reflect standard error of the mean. 
The normalization procedure described in the Methods section 
implies that across-subjects variance of reaction times is zero 
for “New” objects. Performance for each trial group was 
compared to performance on new trials (paired t-test, d.f.=9). 
The star symbols indicate significance at the p≤.01 level. 
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Discussion 
When a novel natural visual scene is presented to our 
retinae, we almost immediately and automatically extract 
its overall meaning, its “gist” (Wolfe, 1998). In addition, a 
certain number of individual objects usually complement 
this representation. When asked to describe what these 
objects are, observers will usually report 2 or 3 objects 
with confidence. If they have been exposed to the target 
objects shortly before, they will most likely be able to 
report around 4 objects. Even without full confidence, if 
forced to choose from a list of possible objects, observers 
can select the correct objects well above chance. This 
brings the total number of perceived objects up to 6, 
although some of them might not be explicitly 
remembered. Prior exposure to the target objects can even 
increase this total to almost 8 objects. How many of these 
objects are represented in visual awareness remains 
unclear, but this number is certainly greater than 4, since 
in many cases 4 objects or more are explicitly remembered 
by the observer. Finally, a subject will completely fail to 
report between 2 and 4 out of 10 objects, depending on 
the particular scene. Note that, for such a failure to occur, 
the subject must judge other distractor objects more likely 
to have been present in the scene. In other words, the 
observer must be confident to a certain degree that they 
have not perceived the target objects in the scene. 
However, when viewing these same objects in a following 
task, the subject will tend to respond slower and make 
more mistakes than for a set of completely new objects 
(negative priming). Therefore, these objects must have 
been processed to a certain extent by the visual system, 
before being filtered out.  
This sequence of selection among different levels of 
representation can be better understood in terms of the 
underlying neural mechanisms. The early representation 
that is mediated by neural populations in striate and early 
extrastriate visual areas (i.e., V1, V2…) most probably 
describes the scene in a spatially uniform way, except for 
an enhanced resolution towards the center of the visual 
field, and a degradation towards the periphery, due to 
retinal and cortical magnification factors. The 
competition taking place between neurons at this level is 
unlikely to account for object-based selection, since the 
receptive fields will in general be too small, and the 
selectivities too coarse, to allow the representation of 
individual objects. In consequence, most if not all of the 
objects present in the visual scene will be represented (at 
least partly and/or temporarily) at the level of V4 and in 
its postsynaptic target areas in the inferior temporal 
cortex (IT) and in the equivalent regions of the human 
temporal lobe (e.g., fusiform gyrus), where neural 
populations as well as individual neurons have been 
found to code specifically for certain object categories 
such as faces, houses or chairs (Allison et al, 1999; 
Aguirre et al, 1998; Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998; Ishai et 
al, 1999; Chao et al, 1999). A recent electrophysiological 
study in the macaque by Sheinberg and Logothetis (2001) 
indicates that objects in natural cluttered scenes such as 
the ones used here can activate selective neurons in 
infero-temporal cortex in a manner very similar to an 
isolated presentation of the same objects. There is 
supportive experimental evidence that some degree of 
object-based competition within and between neurons 
takes place at this level. For example, 2 objects falling 
inside the same neuronal receptive field are known to 
compete for attentional resources in order to dominate 
the neuronal response (Moran & Desimone, 1985; 
Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Reynolds et al, 1999). As a 
result of this competition, a certain number of objects 
(around 4.5 or more in light of the present results) will be 
selected to receive attentional resources, while the 
representation of the remaining objects (between 2 and 4 
in a scene containing 10 objects) will be actively inhibited, 
so as to avoid interference.  
Neurons coding for “ignored” objects will not 
participate in the following stages of this sequence of 
processing. However, because they are not passively but 
actively suppressed or inhibited (either in IT or its post-
synaptic targets), the neural activity resulting from a 
subsequent presentation of the same object will first need 
to overcome the long-lasting effects of this suppression  
before the neurons can be made to respond again. This 
might constitute the neural basis of the negative priming 
phenomenon (Tipper, 1985). What is remarkable here 
from a biophysical point of view is that a single exposure 
of an image, with an associated neural activity most likely 
lasting less than one second in duration (Kreiman et al., 
2000) must give rise to some sort of long-lasting synaptic 
effect that can lead to a less effective neural 
representation many minutes later when the same image 
is flashed on again.  
Similarly, a single prior presentation of a target object 
in isolation (such as when the control subjects performed 
the word-picture matching task before viewing the scene) 
will trigger some sort of facilitation in the neurons coding 
specifically for this object, that can last long enough to 
enhance later selection of this object, when presented in 
the context of the scene. This corresponds to a positive 
priming effect. The number of selected objects can be 
enhanced in such a way (approximately from 4.5 to more 
than 6), suggesting that the capacity limitation at this level 
is not a “hard” limitation, but one that can be overcome 
in particular situations. 
It is striking to notice that the negative priming effect 
obtained here can be much stronger than the 
corresponding positive priming observed for selected 
objects. Indeed, the “net” effect observed on all target 
objects (whether correctly reported, guessed or rejected) is 
a significant negative priming one. In contrast, most 
psychophysical studies more readily appear to observe 
positive priming (e.g. Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Bar & 
Biederman, 1998). This discrepancy might arise from the 
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fact that in our case, the “prime” stimulus is not 
presented in isolation, but in a cluttered scene containing 
many objects. This might force the visual system to 
activate attentional selection mechanisms, inhibiting the 
representation of certain objects which would otherwise 
(if presented in isolation) receive full attentional 
resources. By comparison, other studies do not in general 
require the visual system to actively select among many 
different competing stimuli.  
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